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ABSTRACT
Business process re-engineering (BPR) has come to
recognize a need for the adoption of socio-technical
methodologies and capabilities for knowledge
representation of qualitative concerns. Security planning
and decision-making has a similar need, and furthermore
socio-technical methods common to BPR can be usefully
applied in this capacity.
The introduction of security models like Defense-inDepth and similar efforts to recognize the organizational
impact of security planning in operational security
management serve as an initial step in educating security
personnel and provide a more comprehensive view, but
unfortunately, security decision-making has traditionally
relied almost solely upon quantitative risk assessment,
cost/benefit mechanisms, and related, functionalistic
methodologies. This greatly limits the representational
capacity of the decision process, and with it the possible
dimensions of analysis in which to consider security
issues.
Within this paper, we briefly examine security planning
and the relevant techniques of BPR and Socio-technical
design, and present a framework for their integration
within the context of information security. It is our
contention that such methodologies can be utilized in the
security decision process to facilitate representation of
subjective concerns and broadly-defined issues germane
to security policy, within an organizational context.
Keywords: Security management, Security
planning; Security processes; Business process
reengineering; Socio-technical modeling

1.

INTRODUCTION

The shift towards a more holistic view of information
security as an organizational concern would necessitate
security management methodologies capable of
incorporating and representing a broader perspective than
has been the case [1]. Such a shift, in essence
necessitated by the rapid change of technology and the
emergence of new organizational structures, has brought
certain classical assumptions central to traditional
security theory into question.
Specifically, the
phenomena of distributed systems and decentralization,
such as that evidenced by the widespread Peer-to-peer
(P2P) applications, facilitate radically different
computing architectures than traditional security
approaches are designed to account for [2]. Additionally,
the changes represented by methodologies like business
process re-engineering (BPR), which advocates
transformational use of IT [3] and radical restructuring of
the firm, have fundamentally altered the structures of
many organizations. In essence, the majority of the
assumptions underlying traditional security theory have
been and are being substantially altered by new
technologies and process-oriented orientations to
business.
We note additionally that information systems
implementation can cause deliberate or unintentional
modification of business processes [4], and this can result
in social and psychological repercussions within the
organization. In the modern business environment, the
need exists for access by as well as interaction with
trusted intranet as well as extranet systems, a need which
explicitly violates a more traditional closed-system
conception assumed by the classic security paradigm [5].
The emerging perspective on such organizations and their
information systems, operating within such a complex
environment, must be one of open systems, as defined in
[6].

These changes in our awareness of information security
necessitate new approaches and revisions to our
awareness of organizational security.
If we truly
recognize a view which goes beyond the functional
problems of threat mitigation, we gain an expanded
perspective for our analysis efforts, and lose nothing in
return. Socio-technical methods which are capable of
representing social context, motives, and emergent
organizational concerns can be employed in business
process redesign and reengineering efforts to mitigate the
effects of radical change and decrease resistance [7]. It is
our contention that similar methods can and should be
utilized explicitly in the security decision process to
facilitate a holistic representation of subjective concerns
and broadly-defined issues germane to security
management and planning, within an organizational
context. Within this paper, we briefly examine security
planning and the relevant techniques of BPR and sociotechnical theory, and present a framework for their
integration within the context of information security.

concerns must inherently affect the security management
of an organization.
The introduction of security models like Defense-inDepth and related efforts by institutions like the
International Standards Organization (ISO), and
International Information Systems Security Certification
Consortium (ISC)2 to promote information security
awareness serve as an initial step in educating security
personnel and provide a more comprehensive and holistic
view of organizational security. Unfortunately, security
decision-making and risk assessment has traditionally
relied almost solely upon the traditional managerial
techniques of quantitative risk assessment, e.g.,
Actualized Loss Expectancy [14], cost/benefit
mechanisms, and related methodologies. We have
elsewhere argued that truly multi-dimensional security
planning needs to incorporate qualitative concerns and
multiple stakeholder perspectives, and to illustrate tradeoffs explicitly in the security decision process [15].
3. RE-ENGINEERING AND SOCIO-TECHNICAL
METHODS

2. SECURITY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
Business Process Reengineering
Traditional security methodologies have been
characterized as functionalistic and even technocratic [8].
The prevailing paradigm of information security evolved
under radically different assumptions [5] about both the
nature of organizations and technology than the modern
IT environment presents – large, centralized, dedicated
computing power (i.e. mainframes) and batch processing,
strict task-oriented, hierarchal power structures, and
closed systems.
Early conceptions, inherently
functionalistic in nature, [9] including the access control
matrix [10] and [11] models, and the information security
notions of the so-called “Orange Book” [12] –
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, constituted
this paradigm [5], with “Confidentiality” as the historical
focus for information security. Decentralization and
web-based technologies, widespread use of redundant and
fail-over systems, and the growing concern with business
continuity planning (BCP) in information security
suggest that Integrity and Availability are increasingly
coming into greater focus.
Information security awareness is multi-dimensional,
often non-technical in nature and trans-organizational in
scope of importance [13]. The controlled governmental
and business environment’s managed information flow
from “high” to “low” has historically been essential to the
preservation of Confidentiality, [9] as the primary
concern of information security.
However, public
awareness of security concerns and the publicity accorded
by the media to potential vulnerabilities across
organizational barriers to a certain extent violates this
constraint, again resulting in an open system. Such

Business Process Reengineering (BPR), a methodology
which achieved wide-scale popularity as a management
tool in the 1990’s [16, 17], is a process-oriented form of
organizational redesign which aims at making radical
changes to an organization to gain large-scale increases in
productivity. The methodology involves a holistic
analysis of the organization oriented around the customer
processes’ perspective, and the delineation of specific
inputs and outputs to the various value-creating
processes. BPR favors the elimination of bureaucracy as
a natural consequence of reorganization and
recombination of tasks and lends itself towards flattening
power structures [18]. The combination of these qualities
suggest that BPR techniques may possess high synergy
with a multidimensional conceptualization of information
security awareness.
BPR, at its inception, was never claimed by its authors to
be an original technique, i.e., [16] nor a comprehensive
methodology. The originators deliberately refrained from
constraining the methodology to a systematic collection
of techniques. It is thus not altogether surprising that
BPR has been identified and criticized variously as being
originally void of a methodology [19], a neo-Taylorist
movement [17], and a management fad [20]. “Real” BPR
has come to be characterized as essentially a top-down
approach to organizational process restructuring intended
to achieve measurable large-scale performance gains [21]
by refocusing business processes around process
customers and reintegrating task-based work into a
process perspective.

Identified unique characteristics of the movement,
common between various interpretations are:
 The consistent notion of its being focused on
“radical” [22] changes, as opposed to incremental
improvement methodologies like TQM [16, 23].
 The stance taken towards IT as a key enabler of the
revolutionary change to be wrought through reengineering [3].
BPR has been widely implemented, and in some cases
used to great success, but high failure rates of 40 to 70
percent reported by organizations [24] seem to suggest
that there are deep roots to this problem. Several BPR
pioneers themselves hold the primary cause of
organizational BPR failure to be the lack of accounting
for the sociopolitical dimension [25, 26].
Socio-technical Theory and BPR
Socio-technical theory holds that there is inherent
interdependent relation between people and technology
[19]. Sociotechnical approaches to systems development
were pioneered in the 1970’s and 80’s [27], as an
incorporation of more organizational and behavioral
approaches to change management. Conceptualizing an
organization as a set of business processes bears great
similarity to notions of a social organization as a
collection of interacting open systems [7], common to
Organizational Development (OD) theory.

these fundamental concepts with the recognition of a
need for integration between human and technology
issues in the changes to be wrought [7, 30], we can see
how a dialogue for the consideration of socio-technical
design ideas in BPR could be created. Unfortunately,
early efforts in this direction minimized the
organizational political issues or viewed them simply as
problems standing in the way of implementing effective
control structures [7]. Socio-technical modeling treats
these “fuzzy” issues as design requirements not altogether
different from more objective criteria and goals.
A fundamental need unique to socio-technical modeling
is the representation of organizational concerns – not
merely the concerns of engineering the design (what
occurs in a process, and how can we make it occur), but
also those of motive (why does it occur in the first
place?). Processes, problems and concerns must be seen
within their social and psychological contexts. These
concerns are inherently different from those of
engineering and design – they are predominantly
qualitative and subjective issues and perceptions held by
multiple people within a given organization. Relevant
techniques for the explicit inclusion of goal hierarchies in
business modeling for IS design have been explored, i.e.,
[31], as have social representation frameworks for
modeling [18] but not specifically in relation to security
management.
4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATION

Why should we concern ourselves with a socio-technical
“soft-systems” approach at all? An organization which
changes the logistics of workflow but fails to facilitate
change to the organizational realities becomes highly
susceptible to failure, unexpected delays, worker
frustration, and even sabotage of the new process [18].
Resistance to change in general assuredly occurs when
the resulting situation created by change is perceived as a
threat to an individual’s security or stability [28].
Additionally, installation and implementation of an
information system can itself result in an unintentional or
intentional “re-designing” of the business processes in
which it is embedded [4] as well as reactionary behavior
as the organization adapts to the change. Insofar as both
people and technology are fundamental to the whole of an
organization, the social and psychological impact of new
technology and process redesign upon the existing
sociopolitical climate and organizational roles must be
taken into account. This is the fundamental insight which
socio-technical design offers us.
The incorporation of socio-technical theory into BPR is
based upon the realization that many of the ideas
associated with the techniques of BPR – process-based
thinking, radical change, and transformative use of IT –
are compatible with socio-technical analysis, when
divorced from a purely Taylorist bias, such as was
espoused by some early BPR advocates [29]. Pairing

Certain commonalities can be seen to exist between the
areas discussed in the previous sections. We recognize
that the commonality of a process-focused perspective
exists between BPR and socio-technical design. It
naturally follows that if it is possible to conceive of a
security process at all, it should be equally possible to reengineer the process thus conceived. Changing business
processes requires mutual adaptation by structures,
processes, people, and technology to accommodate one
another [32] in the new environment. This insight
suggests the possibility of an integrative framework for
change.
The dilemma faced by information security is this: if we
accept, a priori, a purely functionalist definition of
security, we admit essentially that security consists of the
ascertainment of threats, and the mitigation of these
threats by the application of various control measures.
This simplistic notion is not incompatible with sociotechnical theory, nor with any expanded view of security.
In fact, it illustrates a meta-problem in that by applying a
control, we are actually changing the nature of the
security environment, and if we do not take this explicitly
into account, we simply create a vicious reactionary cycle
through the process of control implementation. Figure 1
presents the basic framework of security management
based on the key areas: People, Technology, and Process,

derived from the Defense in Depth model standards for
security management.
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Figure 1. A framework of integrating BPR, sociotechnical theory in information security.
We now briefly describe the various components of the
framework presented.
The foundational components can be defined as follows:
 People:
Within the context of this framework,
this refers to the individuals within the organization,
and the formal as well as informal relationships and
social hierarchies which exist within the
organization.
 Technology: We’ve used this broad term to refer to
the whole of the organizational information
technology infrastructure. In security terms, we are
thus concerned with the IT infrastructure and
computing environment.
 Process:
This refers to the business processes as
well as formally-organized hierarchies which exist
within the organization. It includes the whole corpus
of organizational policy and legal agreements as well
as formal literature, operations manuals, and the like.
At the center of the framework, “Awareness of Threat or
Control” is a self-explanatory definition, but how it
impacts the model must be explained.
We are
considering the perception, or awareness, of a threat (for
example, a public warning of an upcoming worm, or
news of an actual security breach within the
organization), as eliciting a response from each of the
base components (People, Technology, and Process).
Similarly, the implementation of a control impacts
organizational
awareness
and
may
have
social/psychological as well as technical consequences, or
provoke a managerial response.

We turn next to the three sets of controls: Technological,
Managerial, and Social/Psychological.
 Technological controls are well-understood and the
primary subject of traditional information security –
physical controls which mitigate against physical
threats (for example, a network firewall, or even a
low-tech safe).
 Managerial controls are the policies and executive
fiat which can alter the organization’s formal
political structure. These controls protect at the legal
level, and may include, for example, a nondisclosure
agreement, an access control policy, or a directive for
a total shutdown.
 Social/Psychological controls are slightly more
difficult to define – the idea of such a control
originates from behavioral control theory.
In
essence, they comprise the social norms,
organizational awareness and education, and
incentive systems which shape and influence but do
not necessarily compel desired behaviors.
We have included several one-way processes within the
model that characterize several of the more narrowly
focused methodologies discussed briefly within this
paper, namely,








Taylorism is a one-way flow from Process to People,
such that organizational restructuring is simply
imposed upon the existing social organization.
Functionalism is next identified as a one-way
relation, where organizational processes make
demands on technology without regard for either the
existing technological infrastructure or concern for
the effect such implementations on the people within
the organization.
Technocratic bias is described as the imposition of
technological constraints on the social order without
concern for its potential repercussions.
Transformational use of IT within an organization
(the innovative utilization of IT as a key part of longterm strategy) can itself be the cause or inspiration
for process redefinition based on inherent capabilities
of the technology.
Emergent use of IT is occasioned when social group
interaction results in innovative use of IT which were
outside the original intended purpose of that
technology and expands its utility.

The applied knowledge of Process Re-engineering,
Socio-technical Theory and Organizational Development
are represented as bidirectional relationships between the
foundational components. Process Re-engineering relates
Process and Technology, Socio-technical Theory
connects People and Technology, and Organizational
Development relates People and Process. These three
disciplines form a larger body of knowledge which forms
the integral framework for security management.

Within this framework, then, knowledge of business
process re-engineering, socio-technical theory, and
organizational development become amenable to security
management as mediators between the three fundamental
components of People, Technology, and Process. Ideally,
this presents a more holistic perspective and broadly
suggests developed fields of study within the literature
which can facilitate adherence to this framework. This is
certainly not to suggest that any individual might have
mastery of these various subject matter, only that basic
concepts and techniques from these areas of knowledge
could be adapted to facilitate a broader understanding of
security management in relation to an organization.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper takes a preliminary step towards a truly
integrated conceptualization of information security
awareness as a multidimensional concern. We broadly
sketch the relevant areas of knowledge which seem
appropriate and even natural to such an integration and
discuss briefly the limitations of more specialized and
focused approaches. We then present a conceptual
framework for integration that visually demonstrates the
relationships implicit between the elements from a
perspective of security awareness.
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